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POL 32-1 Chicom-USSR
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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET 264

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ACTION EA 15

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,
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P 050423Z JUL 69
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7091
INFO AMEMBASSY TAIPEI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

S E C R E T HONG KONG 3687

SUBJ: FUKIEN RAID

1. AS YET PEKING HAS MADE NO MENTION OF JULY 2 GRC RAID ON FUKIEN. IF RAID WAS RELATIVELY SMALL-SCALE HIT-AND-RUN ATTACK, WE SUSPECT CHICOMS WILL VIEW IT PARTLY AS PROPAGANDA MOVE TO OFFSET EMBARRASSING T-33 DEFECTION. ON OTHER HAND, IF RAID WAS SUBSTANTIAL OPERATION AND/OR IS FOLLOWED BY ADDITIONAL ASSAULTS, PEKING LIKELY TO REGARE ACTIVITY AS PART OF COORDINATED US-USSR PLOT TO "ENCIRCLE AND SUPPRESS" CHINA AND, MORE SPECIFICALLY, AS CONSEQUENCE OF JOINT US-SOVIET-GRC PLANNING.

2. IN VIEW OF THE US MILITARY PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE ON TAIWAN AND IN CONTEXT OF PEKING'S CURRENT WAR PSYCHOSIS ABOUT SOVIET THREAT TO CHINA, CONTINUATION OF SUCH RAIDS CANNOT BUT BE SEEN BY PEKING AS SANCTIONED OR EVEN ABETTED BY THE UNITED STATES. IN OUR OPINION, SUCH ACTIVITY BY THE GRC THUS IS NOT ONLY HIGHLY PREJUDICAL TO OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS IN REDUCING TENSIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE US BUT, IN VIEW OF PEKING'S PRESENT STATE OF MIND, INVOLVES A LEVEL OF RISK-TAKING WHICH FAR OUTWEIGHS ANY CONCEIVABLE ADVANTAGE TO ANY PARTY CONCERNED.

3. THEREFORE, IF JULY 2 RAID IS CONFIRMED WE RECOMMEND

(2)

Thank you, 3687
1-5-69

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THAT DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN TAKE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCLAIM PRIOR US KNOWLEDGE AND DISAVOWAL OF ANY ENCOURAGEMENT OF SUCH ACTIVITY. MARTIN
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